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ABSTRACT
This paper describes a three-level organizational model or decom-
position procedure named the Generalized Hierarchical Model (GHM) . The
GHM algorithm focuses upon a multiple criteria approach to hierarchical
decision-making via mathematical programming decomposition theory.
The GHM has been implemented on a CDC CYBER-175 computer and has been
tested extensively. The results of this research tend to confirm that
the GHM can offer a systematic approach to organizational design, multi-
period planning, and resource allocation in decentralized organizations,

1 . INTRODUCTION
Since the development of the Dantzig-Wolfe [6,7] decomposition
algorithm, a number of researchers have noted how closely the algorithm's
solution procedure parallels the decision-making process found within
a hierarchical organization. See [1,4,5,12] for a limited sample.
Over the years, other decomposition algorithms have been developed for
mathematical programming problems that possess a particular structure;
works by Lasdon [19] and Geoff rion [16,17] have provided an excellent
summary of these mathematical techniques. Because the solution pro-
cedures of these decomposition algorithms can mimick the information
exchanges that occur within hierarchical organizations, they have been
used to model organizational decision-making. Reviews of the economic
and behavioral aspects of these applications are given in Ruefli [25]
and Jennergren [18]
.
Recently, alternative formulations of decomposition models that
accommodate multiple criteria optimization have evolved. Unlike their
predecessors, these decomposition models were developed specif ically to
model the resource allocation process within a multilevel, decision-
making hierarchy. The highest level of the hierarchy is assigned the
task of generating goals for and/or allocating resources to the inter-
mediate decision-makers. The decisions at the intermediate level are
structured as goal programming problems that attempt to minimize devi-
ations from the goals generated at the highest level. These deviations
are minimized by selecting alternative proposals generated by subordinate
units at the lowest level of the organization's hierarchy.
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Tbe initial effort in this area was Ruefli's Generalized Goal
Decomposition (GGD) model [23,24]. He utilized the shadow prices (dual
solutions) of the intermediate level decisions and the principles of gen-
eralized linear programming to coordinate the process of goal generation
by the highest level decision-maker. Later Freeland [13] as well as
Freeland and Baker [14] developed a model which also used shadow prices
for coordinating decision-making in the hierarchy. However, the principles
of Benders' partitioning procedure [3] were incorporated into the highest
level decision in order to effect the process of goal generation. Freeland
[15] later discussed the relationship of his model to the GGD model. As
noted earlier the evolution of these algorithms represented a departure
from the practice of defining an organizational model based upon a given
decomposition procedure. That is, both the efforts of Freeland and Ruefli
were explicitly dedicated to the construction of organizational models.
Sweeney _et al_. [26] have characterized the models as "composition" ap-
proaches to organizational decision-making.
Although Ruefli [23, p. B510] noted the "insufficiency of [shadow]
prices alone to coordinate the activities of an organization," neither
the Freeland and Eaker nor Ruefli algorithm utilized deviations from
generated goals as a mechanism for coordinating decision making. Davis
[8] and Davis and Talavage [9] realized the possible advantages of util-
izing these deviations as a coordinative input. Their research led to
the formulation of two new models: the Centralized Goal Decomposition
(CGD) model, which relies upon goal deviations as a coordinative input
to the highest level decision-maker, and the Hybrid Goal Decomposition
(HGD) model which uses both deviations and simplex multipliers. Both
the CGD and HGD models are formulated for a three-level organization.
Further, an overall problem was defined for these algorithms, and this
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problem was identical to overall problem solved by Ruefli's GGD model.
Finally, the convergence for both CGD and KGD models was shown.
Because the GGD, CGD, and HGD algorithms solve the same overall
mathematical programming problem, their solutions' properties offer
a vehicle for testing the efficacy of their respective coordinative
mechanisms. After Davis and Talvage [9] applied these algorithms to
several test examples, they concluded the following:
1) The simplex multiplier as a sole coordinative input to the
highest level decision-maker was least effective. In fact,
in all test examples, the GGD algorithm failed to converge
without substantial modification.
2) The utilization of deviations as coordinative mechanims gen-
erated a solution which at convergence was nearly optimum.
3) The marginal advantage gained by using both simplex multipliers
and deviations was small and did not guarantee optimality.
4) In most cases, the simplex multiplier was a detrimental co-
ordinative input to the decisions at the lowest level. The
computational properties of the goal programming decision
associated with the intermediate level of the organization
were shown to inhibit the efficiency of simplex multipliers
as coordinative mechanisms.
Recently an article by Winkofsky et al. [31] presented a hierarchical
decision process model (DPM) which utilizes a binary (0-1) goal program-
ming model with preemptive priority factors (BGP) at each level of the
organization. Further their coordinative mechanisms were either goal
adjustment vectors (similar to Davis and Talavage's [9] deviations) or
-4-
"broad changes in the current performance" [32, p. 274] levels for sub-
ordinate subsystems within the hierarchy. Their model is an extension
of the work done by Ruefli [23], Freeland and Baker [14], and Davis and
Talavage [9J. Although Winkofsky et al. focus upon the "composition"
approach described in Sweeny, et a_l . [27], they do not demonstrate how
their model's "derived organizational problem" is related to an "ideal
organizational problem." (See [27] for an elaboration of these terms.)
In other words, instead of viewing the DPM as a composition approach to
an ideal problem, Winkofsky _et _al_. provide an intriguing model designed
to act as a simulation laboratory for testing the impact of alternative
organizational policies and design issues on organizational decision-
making and resource allocation.
The Generalized Hierarchical Model (GHM) presented in this study
is an extension of these previous models, and it expands upon a two-level
version of the model presented in [10]. It attempts to eliminate the
negative properties of the previous algorithms while preserving their
positive attributes. Although similar to the Winkofsky et al . BGP
hierarchical model, the GHM retains the spirit of a true decomposition
algorithm. The GHM has been tested on simulated as well as real-world
administrative problems. The results of this testing indicate that the
GHM can offer a systematic approach to the problems of organizational
design, multiperiod planning, and resource allocation in decentralized
organizations
.
I 2 specifies the structure of the GHM, and § 3 presents several
theorems characterizing the solution and convergence properties of the
model. § 4 relates the results of several computational tests of the
GHM, and a final § provides concluding comments.
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2. DEFINITION OF THE GENERALIZED HIERARCHICAL MODEL
This § presents the GHM, and for ease of exposition it will be
divided into two subsections. §§ 2.1 will describe the organization
and decision structure of the model. In this §§ an explicit statement
for several key functions will be omitted; however, they will be detailed
in §§ 2.2. By varying the functional form of these functions, several
versions of the GHK (viz., linear, quadratic, etc.) are possible. I§
2.2 will outline the linear version of the GHM, its simplest form.
2.1 Organizational and Decision Structure of the GHM
The decision-makers within the organization will be called subsystems.
The model discussed in this paper employs three levels of hierarchical
decision-making. However, the GHM can be modified to accommodate a two-
level or n-level decision-making hierarchy. The subsystem at the highest
level of the organization will be referred to as the supremal subsystem
(see Figure 1). At the second level of the organization, there are M man-
aging subsystems or managers. Finally, on the lowest level of the organi-
zation are N infimal subsystems or operating units. Using the assumption
of M managing subsystems, there exists a series of integers, r ,r..,...,r
,
such that infimal subsystems r + 1 through r are subordinate to
K— J. K.
managing subsystem k. For consistency, assuming that there are N in-
fimal subsystems, r
n
must equal zero while r must equal N.
Each subsystem within the organization is assigned a specific deci-
sion. These decisions collectively describe the GHM and are given by
M
3
u
o
3
M
j-j
W
c
c
cd
N
to
l-l
o
>
w
I
01
u
3
OS
•r-'
-8-
;uations (1) through (14) in Table 1. Figure 2 details the assij
: the decisions including the model's informational flows or coor-
jchanisms. The individual decisions will now be detailed emphasi,
.iteraction between the subsystems on adjacent levels of the organ:
The first decision to be discussed is that of managing subsyst
,
defined by equations (5.k) through (11. i). Managing subsystem k
wo sets of goals. The first goals are specified by a m, -column ve>
,
(t), which represents a set of external goals. These goals are g£
rated by the supremal subsystem on interation t, and coordinate the
ictions of the managing subsystems. The second set of goals, g, , is
nZ-column vector of internal goals. These goals are constant through
Lhe optimization and can be regarded as a mechanise used by managing
subsystem k to coordinate the efforts of each of its subordinate, in-
fimal subsystems. The internal goals can also create a certain level
autonomy for each managing subsystem.
Corresponding to the external goal vector, G (t), are two m,-
column vectors, Y, (t) and Y, (t), representing positive and negative
deviations from G, (t), respectively. Similarly, there are two m*-
column vectors, y (t) and y, (t), corresponding to positive and negative
deviations from the internal goal vector, g, . Managing subsystem k has
K
at its disposal a set of n. -column vector proposals, X. (1) ,. .
.
,X. (t).
generated during the previous interations by the i-th infimal subsystem
(i=r, i +l» • •
.
»r, ) . In creating a composite proposal for each of its
subordinate infimal subsystems, managing subsystem k can select any con-
vex combination of the i-th infimal's operating proposals, X.(D » • • • t\(
(i=r
k_ 1+l,. . . ,r.) . To relate the infimals' proposals to the
manager's
goals, Gk (t) and g, , managing subsystem k has two sets of matrices,
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Figure 2. Detailed Structure for the Generalized
Model Giving the Decision Assignment
and Resulting Flows of Information
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equations CD through (14) in Table 1. Figure 2 details the assignment
of the decisions including the model's informational flows or coordinative
mechanisms. The individual decisions will now be detailed emphasizing the
interaction between the subsystems on adjacent levels of the organization.
The first decision to be discussed is that of managing subsystem
k, defined by equations (5.k) through (11. i). Managing subsystem k has
two sets of goals. The first goals are specified by a m, -column vector,
G, (t), which represents a set of external goals. These goals are gen-
erated by the suprercal subsystem on interation t, and coordinate the
actions of the managing subsystems. The second set of goals, g, , is a
mJ-column vector of internal goals. These goals are constant throughout
the optimization and can be regarded as a mechanism used by managing
subsystem k to coordinate the efforts of each of its subordinate, in-
fimal subsystems. The internal goals can also create a certain level of
autonomy for each managing subsystem.
Corresponding to the external goal vector, G (t), are two nt-
column vectors, Y (t) and Y, (t), representing positive and negative
deviations from C, (t), respectively. Similarly, there are two mJ-
column vectors, y, (t) and y (t) , corresponding to positive and negative
deviations from the internal goal vector, g, . Managing subsystem k has
at its disposal a set of n. -column vector proposals, X. (1) , . .
.
,X.(t)
,
generated during the previous interations by the i-th infimal subsystem
(i=r. ,+l,% . . ,r, ) . In creating a composite proposal for each of its
subordinate infimal subsystems, managing subsystem k can select any con-
vex combination of the i-th infimal's operating proposals, X . (1) , . .
.
,X
.
(t)
(i=r, .-1, . . . ,r, ) . To relate the infimals' proposals to the onager's
goals, G, (t) and g. , managing subsystem k has two sets of matrices,
iaDie 1
Specification of the GHN
Supremal Subsystem's Problem
(1) Min Z
Q
(t+l) = S^_
x
{c
G
G
k
(t+1) + B^tS*(t+l)] + W~[S"(t+D] )
s.t. k
(2.k) I G (t+1) + I S+(t+l) - I S~(t+1) - C, (t) + Y+(t) - Y~(t)m,k
^r ^ k
for k«l,...,M where I is the (ro. x m, ) - identity matrix
(4) G
k
(t+1) 1 °. Ek (t+1) - 0> sk (t+1) i °
Managing Subsystem k*6 Problem (k - 1,...,M)
(s.k) Min yt) - r^
+1
rj_
x
c^cj) x^j) + b+p+(o] + \l\M]
+ w
k [yk
(t)1 +w
k [yk
(t)]
(6 - k) r
i"Vl+i
zU w" x±w - \< (t) + V"k(° * Gk(t)
(8.i) £* X
i CJ)
- 1. \(j) 10 for i- rk_x+l rfc
(9.k) Y+(t) > 0, Y~(t) >
The subsequent generation of the n, -component goal vector for
the infiraal subsystem i is based upon equations (5.k) through
(9.k) and is defined as
(10. i) Tfjt+l) - r
±
[X*(t), ^(t), Y+(t), t'(t), y*(t), y~(t)]
for i = r, ,+l,...,r, . wherek-1 k
(11. i) X*(t) - E* X
±
(j) X^j)
Infimal Subsystem i's Problem (i - 1,...,N)
(12.1) Min c
i
X
1
(t+l) + w [c (t+1)] + it [o (t+1)]
s.t.
(13. i) B,[X,(t+l)] - I o,(t+l) + I c"(t+l) - Y, (t+1)11
^-f -1
(14. i) D^ft+1) -F
1
(15.1) X
1
(t+1) >.0, o
1
(t+l) ^0, o~(t+l) 10
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B. and B!, (i=r, ,+1, . . . ,r, ) . B_. is a (m, x n.)-matrix which linearly
relates each X^j), (j=l,...,t), to G (t). Similarly B'. is a (mJ x n.)-
matrix which linearly relates X.(j), (j=l,...,t), to g, . These relation-
ships are defined by equations (6.k) and (7.k), respectively.
Associated with each infimal subsystem's proposal is a n.-row
vector, c
.
, such that the cost of a particular proposal vector, X.(j),
is given by the inner product, c.X.(j). Also associated with the
deviation vectors, Y (t) and Y (t), there are two penalty cost func-
tions W [Y (t)] andW [Y (t)], respectively. Similarly, associated
with the vectors, >%(t) and y,(t), are the two penalty cost functions,
w, [y, (t)] and v [y (t)]. (A detailed specification of the functional
form for these penalty functions will be given in §§ 2.2.) Each of
these costs is included in equation (5.k).
Managing subsystem k's problem is one of generating a composite
proposal, X.(t), for infimal subsystem i, (i=r,
-+1,. .
.
, r.) . These
composite proposals must satisfy equations (6.k) through (9.k) while
the objective function given by equation (5.k) is minimized. As
mentioned earlier, in generating each proposal, X.(t), the manager is
allowed to consider only convex combinations of a subordinate infimal
kis previous proposals, X.(j), (j=l,...,t). Thus, X.(t) is defined as
(11. i) X*(t) = I* X.(j) X.(j) (i=rk_ 1+l,...,rk ),
where E . >. .(j) = 1 and X.(j) >^ for j=l,...,t. Therefore,
managing subsystem k is concerned with generating an optimum set of
^(jTs.
Like previous organizational models, the GHM employs an iterative
solution procedure. Once the k-th managing subsystem's problem has
-11-
been solved, that is the optimum set of X (j)'s and the deviations,
Y (t), Y (t), y. (t) and y. (t), have been generated, each management
k k k k
unit has two alternatives to reduce its objective function value.
First, each can ask the supremal subsystem for a new goal vector,
G (t+1), which will be more compatible with its subordinate infimals'
AC
proposals. Second, each manager can ask its subordinate infimal sub-
systems to generate new proposals which more closely conform to its
current goals, G (t) and g .
k k
The second alternative will be discussed first. Having generated the
optimal solution to its problem, the k-th managing subsystem generates a
n
.
-column vector of goals, 7. (t+1), for each of its infimals (i=r +l,...,r )
using equation (10. i). (A detailed specification of T. is given in §§ 2.2.)
(10. i) Y
±
(t+1) = r.[X*(t), Gk(t), Y+(t), Y~(t), y£(t), y~(t)]
The goal vector, y.(t+l), is in turn used by infimal subsystem i in the
selection of its next proposal vector, X.(t+1). This selection process
is accomplished through the solution of the i-th infimal subsystem's goal
programming problem given by equations (12. i) through (15. i). Associated
with the goal vector, y.(t+l), are two n.-column vectors,
c.(t+l) and a. (t+1), representing positive and negative deviations from
y. (t+1), respectively. To relate the proposal vector, X.(t+1), to the
goal vector, y.(t+l), each infimal subsystem has the linear function,
|3. [X. (t+1) ] . (Again, the formal specification of this linear function
will be detailed in §§ 2.2.) This relationship is defined by equation
(13. i). The i-th infimal subsystem must also satisfy certain technological
constraints given by the equation (14. i):
-12-
(14. i) D. X.(t+1) 7 Fi ,
where D. is a (£. x n.)-matrix of technological coefficients, and F.
is a £. -column vector stipulating a set of fixed, right-hand-side values.
In the solution process, each infimal subsystem must consider
two costs. The first is the cost of the proposal, X. (t+1)
,
given by
the inner product, c.X.(t+l). The second is the penalty cost associated
with the deviations, a. (t+1) and a. (t+1), which are defined by the
penalty functions, u;. [a. (t+1)] and u). [a. (t+1)], respectively. (These
functions will be defined in §§ 2.2.) The sum of these costs gives
the objective function, equation (12. i). Once the infimal subsystem
has determined its proposal vector, X.(t+1), these proposals are for-
warded to its managing subsystem for consideration at the next iteration.
As indicated in Figure 2, X.(t) can also be passed to the i-th
infimal subsystem (i»r. .+1 r. ) by manager k. Later it will be
shown that X.(t) represents a feasible solution to the i-th infimal s
problem on iteration t+1. Hence, X.(t) can be used as an initial
feasible solution for the infimal' s problem on iteration t+1. (The cur-
rent GHM computer code does not pass X. to the i-th infimal. Only y. (t+1)
is used as the coordinative mechanism.)
While infimal subsystem i has been solving its problem, managing
subsystem k has also sent its deviations, Y. (t) and Y (t), from the
current goal vector, G, (t), to the supremal subsystem. Because the
supremal subsystem "knows" the goal values passed to managing subsystem
k on the last iteration, the supermal can determine the goals that each
managing subsystem could achieve with no deviations, given the k-th
manager's current operating proposals. This goal vector is defined as
-13-
(16. k) G*(t) = Gk (t) + Y+(t) - Y~(t),
and corresponds to the right-hand-side of equation (2.k). The supremal
subsystem is concerned with generating a new set of goals, G, (t+1)
(k=l,...,M), which will minimize the deviations from the k-th managing
subsystem's proposed operating levels, G, (t). These deviations are
given as the m, -column vectors, S (t+1) and S, (t+1), for k=l,...,M.
This new set of goals must satisfy the constraints given by equation (3)
:
< 3) Ek=i
p
k
Gk (t+1) H'
where G. Is a nu-column vector containing the organization's overall
goals, and P. is a (m, x nO-matrix that linearly relates G, (t+1) to
G
n
. Having generated the optimal set of goals, G, (t+1), (k=l,...,M),
the supremal subsystem sends the new goal vector, G, (t+1), to managing
subsystem k. The managing subsystem then increments t to t+1, and the
entire process is repeated.
Although several starting procedures are available, the simplest and
perhaps the most efficient is as follows. On iteration one infimal
subsystem i, (i=l,...,N), generates its minimum cost proposal considering
only constraint (14. i). The penalty costs for deviations arising from
equation (13. i) are neglected. Next, the k-th manager, (k=l,...,M),
takes the proposals X. (1) , (i=r, ..+1, . . . ,r, ) , and generates the resulting
deviations arising in equations (6.k) and (7.k) given that G, (1) equals
zero, and g, is as assigned. The resulting deviations, Y (1) and Y > (1)
are then forwarded to the supremal subsystem for consideration on iteration
two. Hence the supremal' s problem is not solved on iteration one because
G, (1), (k=l,...,M), was set to zero. It is interesting to note that
-14-
this starting procedure closely resembles a zero-base budgeting system [21],
Also the GHM as well as other multiple criteria, decomposition algorithms
[9,14,15,23] can be viewed as a mathematical model of a Planning, Pro-
gramming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) ; see [24],
2.2. The Linear Version of the GHM
§§ 2.1 did not provide an explicit statement for several key func-
tions. These include:
1. The penalty costs in equations (1), (5.k), and (12. i);
2. The function, F
.
, in equation (10. i), which generates ^.(t+l)
for each infimal i; and
3. The function, &., in equation (13. i), which relates X.(t+1)
to y. (t+1).
Through the explicit statement of these functions, several versions
(viz . , linear, quadratic, etc.) of the GHM can be formulated. It should
be emphasized that the functional form chosen for these unspecified
functions should be consistent throughout the hierarchy. That is, the
penalty cost functions should be of the same polynomial order at each
decision-making level. The penalty weights should also be consistent.
The consistent weighting criterion placed upon the manager's and subor-
dinate infimals' deviation vectors implies that the echelon behaves as
a "cooperative" organization. That is, in the interaction between the
managers and their respective subordinates, each infimal' s objective
function has been structured so that it will seek to minimize its man-
ager's deviations and their associated costs. On the other hand, in
the interaction between the supremal and the managers, the managers can
retain some measure of autonomy through their internal goals. The supremal
attempts to adjust the external goals so that the resulting costs of the
the deviations are minimized over the ensemble of managing subsystems.
-15-
Because the deviation vectors, a.(t-t-l) and c.(t+l), represent positive
and negative deviations from y. (t+1), respectively, the penalty function
in equation (12. i) also depends on the specific form of y.(t+l).
Finally, the specification of £. must also be consistent with the form
of v. (t+1), which is derived via T .
.
1 l
This paper will focus upon the linear version of the GHM, which
is its simplest form. The functions for the linear version are given
in Table 2 as equations (19. k) through (27. i).
The first step in defining the linear model is to specify the
penalty cost functions, K [Y (t)] and W [Y , (t)], as the inner products,
W Y (t) and W Y (t) , respectively. This corresponds to the utilization
K. K. K. K.
of an absolute error criterion for the penalty cost function, if the
nL-row vectors, W and W
,
are such that W equals W , for k=l,...,M.
A similar formulation for w [y (t)] and w [y (t)] gives w,y, (t) and
w y (t), respectively.
Next, the decision structure used by the managing subsystems to
generate the y.(t+l) goal vectors for their subordinates must be
specified. In deriving these vectors for iteration t+1, managing sub-
system k first assumes that G (t) will be held constant. Next, manager
K.
k assumes that only infimal subsystem i will be able to generate a
proposal, X.(t+1), which more closely satisfies the goal vectors,
G (t) and g . Using these assumptions, managing subsystem k subtracts
the contribution of its other subordinate infimal subsystems from
G
k
(t) and gk
giving
(17. i) Y.(t+1) =
G
k
(t)
p
:
r
k-i
+
^
B
p
X (t), (i=r
k_ 1
+l, ...,r
k )
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Table 2
Linear Specification of the GHM
(is. k) ^rYk (t)1
= w
k
Y
k
(t)
where W is a iil -vector for k = 1,...,M
(20. k) \t\(t)] = Wk Yk (t)
where W. is a m, -vector for kV = 1 M
(21 .k) v£[y£(t)] w+ y+(t)
where w is a m^-vector for k 1 M
(22.k) w
k [yk (t)]
= w~ yk (t)
where w is a mJ* -vector for k = 1,...,M
(23. i) Y i (t+1) =
B!
L. 1 J
x*(t) -
y+Ct)
+
Y
k (t)
^k
(t)
(24. i)
for i = 1,. . . ,N
B.
6
i
[X.(t)] =
B!
i
— x —
i
X
±
(t) for i = 1, . .
.
,K
(25. i) wt[o\(t)] = [W* : w*] o*(t)
'k : "k J
w
i'
for i = 1, . . . ,N
w~[o~(t)] = [W~
:
w~] o~(t) for i = 1....N
(27. i) n. = m, + m^ for i = 1,...,N
-17-
Using equations (6.k) and (17. i), the definition of 7. (t+1) by equation
(23. i) follows. Thus given the goal, y.(t+l), each infimal subsystem
attempts to generate X. (t+1) such that the following conditions are
fulfilled:
" B,
(is. i) e.[xi (t+i)]
=
i
b!
>- i -j
X
i
(t+1) = YjCt+l)
This definition of £. is given in equation (24. i). In general, however,
infimal subsystem i will not be able to generate a proposal, X.(t+1),
which satisfies this equality. Accordingly, the n .-deviation vectors,
a. (t+1) and o.(t+l), are introduced. The linear versions of the
penalty cost functions w. [c. (t+1)] and id. [c. (t+1) ] are defined by
equations (25. i) and (26. i). For consistency, the penalty weights
associated with deviations for infimal subsystem i are identical to
those for corresponding deviations at the managing subsystem.
The strategy for generating y.(t+l) presented in this paper places
stringent demands upon the infimal subsystems. It requires that each
infimal single-handedly attempts to eliminate the deviations from its
manager's current solution. Alternative approaches which prorate the
manager's deviations among the subordinate infimal subsystems are pos-
sible and have been investigated. Prorating schemes could be based
upon proportional resource utilization and/or goal contribution as well
as the marginal cost associated with a given infimal 's elimination of
a unit of a goal deviation. Each of these alternatives has been computa-
tionally tested. Although it is perhaps managerially unenlightened,
the strategy described in equation (23. i) has proven to be the most
efficient at squeezing out what Williamson [31] as well as Schiff and
Lewin [26] have referred to as "organizational" slack.
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As noted earlier, the GHM can accommodate n levels of hierarchical
decision-making. For example, if one fixes the value of G (t) to a
K
constant vector, G,
,
then the interaction between managing subsystem
k and its subordinate infimal units is similar to that of a standard two-
level decomposition procedure. Also, a four-level version is possible
if one replaces a given infimal subsystem with a submanager and an asso-
ciated ensemble of infimal subsystems. Of course this substitution pro-
cess could be repeated to generate n levels of decision-making.
In contrast with previous organizational models the technique of
merging penalty functions with operating proposal costs in order to
effect the solution by the column generators is novel. This approach
allows the GHM to act as a pure decomposition procedure. This concept
is discussed in detail in Davis [10], In addition, one should note
the ommission of all cost vectors in the three level model creates a
simplified goal programming structure, similar to the Ruefli [23,24]
and Freeland [13, 15] models. This approach requires an a priori
specification of penalty weights that will subsequently remain constant
throughout optimization Thus the linear version of the GHM utilizes a
linearly additive utility formulation.
3. ANALYTICAL PROPERTIES OF THE GHM
The GHM has been designed to mimick the decision-making process
within a hierarchical organization, and thus it can be classified as
an organizational model. The fact that the GHM is concerned with
decision-making in an organization necessarily implies the existence
of a global or real-world problem for that organization. This issue
raises two concerns to which modelers must address themselves. The
-19-
first is the compatability of the overall (i.e. undecomposed) problem
solved by a specific organizational model with the global problem
faced by the organization. The second is the efficacy of an organi-
zational model in solving its version of the overall problem.
In either concern, the specification of the model's overall
problem is of primal importance. Unless a modeler has a reasonable
understanding of this overall problem, a model's applicability to
the global or real-world problem cannot be evaluated. Unfortunately,
a discussion of the difficulties and problems encountered in defining
and enumerating global problems are beyond the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, the need for a global problem specification remains.
This section will focus upon the definition of the overall problem
solved by the GHM and will access the ability of the GHM to solve this
problem.
The overall mathematical programming problem for the GHM is given
in equations (28) through (34) in Table 3. Theorem 1 states that the
GHM generates a feasible solution to this overall problem at each iteration.
THEOREM 1 : The Generalized Hierarchical Model given by equation (1)
through equation (15) generates a feasible solution to the overall
problem, equation (28) through equation (34), at every iteration .
Proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix 1.
The efficacy of the GHM in solving the overall problem will now
be discussed. Proof of Theorem 2 demonstrates convergence of the GHM.
THEOREM 2 : If a finite optimal solution exists to the overall problem
given by equations (28) through (3h), then the linear version of the
-20-
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GHM, given by equations (1) through (15) and (19) through (27),
converges to a finite limit .
Proof of the Theorem is given in Appendix 2. The proof is
accomplished by defining a composite objective function for the model.
At each iteration, this composite objective function is given by
equation (35).
(35) Z(t) = Z*
=]_ c.X*(t) +%ml [c Gk (t) +
k
« (t) + \\ (t) +« (t) + V\ (t) J
Note that this equation is obtained by inserting the iteration t solu-
tion values generated by the GHM into equation (28), the objective
function for the overall problem.
Theorem 1 has shown that the solution given by the GHM on each
iteration is a feasible solution to the overall problem. If we assume
that a finite optimum solution exists for the overall problem, say Z
,
then it can be concluded that:
(36) Z(t) >_ Z
Q
for t = 1,2, ...
Proof of Theorem 2 shows that the sequence, Z(l), Z(2),..., is monotonically
decreasing. That is:
(37) Z(t+1) 1 Z(t) for t = 1,2,...
Because each Z(t) is bounded from below by equation (36), a Cauchy
sequence results. It can thus be concluded that a cluster point exists,
or equivalently, for any e > 0, there exists t* such that:
-22-
(38) |Z(t*) - Z(t*+k)| < e for k=l,2,...
In other words, the GHK converges.
Equations (37) and (38) are crucial for the proof of the GHM's
convergence. In the proof, several assumptions have been made in
order to demonstrate that the iterative objective function sequence
is such that:
(39) Z(l) > Z(2) > ... > Z(t*-1) > Z(t*) = Z(t*+k) for k = 1,2,...
These assumptions were made so that the proof of Theorem 2 would
analytically display the same convergence characteristics demonstrated
in computational testing of the GHM. In computational practice, the
linear version of the GHM demonstrates the convergence pattern seen
in equation (39), where t* is usually less than ten and is often less
than five. Thus, in application, the assymptotic convergence implied by
equation (38) is being satisfied in a more stringent respect. That is:
(40) |Z(t*) - Z(t*+k) | = for t* finite and k = 1,2,...
Further in the proof of Theorem 2, it is shown that Corollary 1 follows.
C0R0LLAR.Y 1 . The following characteristics will exist at convergence
of the model on iteration t*: X.(t +1) = X.(t +1) for i=l,...,N. That
is, the optimal proposal generated by managing subsystem k, (k=l,...,M)
,
for infimal subsystem i, (i=r +l,...,r ), at iteration t +1 is identicalk—
1
k
to the optimal proposal generated by infimal subsystem i .
Recall infimal subsystem i's constraints:
-23-
(13. i)
(14. i)
E.
l
B!
l
X.(t) - I o.(t) + I o.(t) = Y.(t) and
l r,.i n.i l
D.X.(t) -F.,
l l > l
where
b!
X.(t) = B.[X.(t)] (see equation 24. i)
Constraint (13. i) places no restriction on X.(t). Any X.(t) which
satisfies equation (14. i) also satisfies equation (13. i). The
purpose of equation (13. i) is to direct infimal subsystem i toward
the selection of X.(t), by minimizing deviations from the goal vector
y.(t). Most previous decomposition algorithms considered only equation
(14. i). This implies that use of a linear objective function by infimal
subsystem i requires that its X.(t) necessarily be an extreme point of
the polytope for equation (14. i) . This estabished the necessity that
managing subsystem k consider convex combinations of previous proposals
(extreme points),
(11. i) X*(t) = Z Z X.(j) A.(j)
(8.1) e:
=1 x± (j)
= i, a.(j) > o
in order to generate interior points of the polytope for equation (14. i).
By using constraint (13. i), infimal subsystem i is free to generate
any point in its feasible polytope as an optimum decision. Each infimal
is no longer totally dependent upon its managing subsystem to generate
an interior point for an optimum proposal. Furthermore, Corollary 1
states that at convergence the optimal proposal generated by infimal
subsystem i corresponds to the one generated by its managing subsystem.
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Corollary 1 shows that the GHM possesses a desired behavioral
property often sought in organizational modeling (see [21]). In the
GHM each decision-maker generates its own limiting solution. Guidance
in selecting solutions flows from above. In contrast, each of the mul-
tiple criteria organizational models [9,13,23,24] discussed earlier re-
quires each managing subsystem to generate the limiting solution for its
subordinate infimal systems.
The remainder of this section will discuss the solution properties
of the model. As stated earlier, Theorem 2 guarantees at least assymptotic
convergence of the model to a limiting solution for the overall organi-
zational problem given in equations (28) through (34). Further, this
limiting solution is feasible and bounded. Computational testing has
indicated that the GHM converges to a limiting solution faster than the
previous models discussed in the introduction. In addition, n£ hueristic
starting procedures are required for this convergence.
A possible explanation for the improved convergence characteristics
of the model follows. All of the previous multiple criteria models use
simplex multipliers associated with managing subsystem k's problem as
a mechanism for coordinating the decisions at one or more levels of the
organization. Use of simplex multipliers can create convergence problems
for organizational models that utilize a goal programming format.
Recall that the manager's problem attempts to choose least costly
proposals and to force the goal deviation vectors to zero. The asso-
ciated goal programming formulation of this decision creates computa-
tional difficulties. First, the number of proposals, X.(j) (j=l,...t),
that managing subsystem k uses to generate the composite vectors X.(t)
-25-
for i=r,
1
+l,...,r
, at iteration t is usually less than the total
number of constraints. For example, the constraints (excluding non-
negativity conditions) in the k-th manager's problem originate from
three sources: external and internal goals plus a convex combination
proposal constraint for each subordinate infimal. In total there should
be m, + mJ + r, - r, .. constraints. Computational testing has indi-
cated that the number of X.(j)'s (j=l,...,t) actually selected in the
convex combination search seldom exceeds three for each infimal. Given
this operational maximum for all subordinate infimals, there should be
no more than 3x[r - r, . ] X.(j)'s (i=r, .4>l,,.. l r. and j=l t)
in solution as basic variables. If the total number of constraints ex-
ceeds 3x{r - r ] by a considerable margin, problems can occur.
Given these conditions, the process of forcing goal deviation vectors
to zero often causes the primal problem of the managing subsystem to
become degenerate. As a result, the associated dual to this problem
has multiple optimum solutions. Recall from the theory of linear pro-
gramming that when the primal problem achieves optimality, the simplex
multiplier and the dual solution are essentially the same (they can differ
in sign). Thus, if multiple dual solutions occur, then any decomposition
procedure or organizational model using simplex multipliers as coordinating
mechanisms can experience a breakdown in coordination. This results from
the fact that the managing subsystem does not have a unique specification
for its simplex multipliers.
Even if one could disregard these difficulties, use of the simplex
multiplier can create additional problems. For example, the value of a
simplex multiplier in a linear programming problem is dependent upon
-26-
th e cost associated with a basic variable and not the basic variable's
solution value. Thus, if a particular component of the deviation vector
is a basic variable, its influence on the simplex multiplier is in-
dependent of its value in the current basic solution. Instead, it is
dependent upon the penalty cost assigned to it. Thus, a simplex multi-
plier can have the same value if a particular deviation were 10 or
3
10 . Therefore, usage of the simplex multiplier only establishes that
a particular deviation is a basic variable, but it offers no guidance
on how far goals must be adjusted. On the other hand, the utilization
of deviations conveys considerably more information on the success that
managing subsystem k has had in meeting goals, and indicates how far cer-
tain goals should be adjusted. This additional information tends to
result in faster convergence.
Although the GHM appears to be in some ways better than the previous
multiple criteria, organizational models, the optimality of its limiting
solution cannot be guaranteed. It is possible that the linear version of
the GHK can converge to a near but nonoptimal solution to the overall
problem given in equations (28) through (34). However, this ncnopti-
mality is not unique to the GKM. The potential for nonoptimal solutions
is brought about by several factors. First, Ruefli's three level GGD
model [23] and Freeland's correction to it [15] may not generate feas-
ible solutions to the overall problem. Neither applies a "convex com-
bination" proposal constraint in the manager's problem. That is, there
is no equivalent \. (j) in their models. This omission implies that each
manager can consider the "origin" or null X. vectors. Thus the Ruefli
and Freelanc models have difficulties if constraint (14. i) or its overall
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problem counterpart (31. i) place nonzero minimum proposal levels on a
given infimal. This difficulty can be easily overcome by inserting the
type of convex combination constraints imposed by equations (6.k) through
(8.i).
Unfortunately more serious problems exist in these multiple criteria
organizational models. The previous discussion on degeneracy indicated
possible sources of ambiguity imbedded in the shadow price coordinative
mechanisms. This is further complicated by the fact that unlike the
Dantzig and Wolfe [6] model, no true master program exists for the de-
composition of the overall problem by these three level multiple criteria
algorithms. Instead, each uses a group of partial master programs , which
are coordinated through the supremal subsystem. In addition, no indi-
vidual decision-maker is concerned with the organization's overall ob-
jective function.
Our computational testing has shown that nonoptimal solutions are
possible in the linear versions of all three level multiple criteria
decomposition algorithms. We should stress that a quadratic version of
the GHM [2,11] overcomes this nonoptimality problem. However, this im-
provement is achieved at the expense of significantly higher computa-
tional difficulty and cost.
A. EXPERIENCE WITH COMPUTATIONAL TESTING
Although the first multiple criteria, organizational model was
introduced over ten years ago, implementations (successful or otherwise)
of the algorithms are rare. Ruefli has noted:
Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of the
subject [analytic models of resource allocation]
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we are discussing is the persistent lack of ap-
plications. Modeling efforts usually take place
at the theoretical level and little has been done
to link these efforts to actual problem situations
and actual (or even strongle representative) data.
[25, p. 361]
He continues:
Indeed, one of the very good reasons why
these models have not seen wider use is probably
because they are not very useful. However, until
selected efforts are made to apply these models
and the problems and successes are reported, we
must continue to operate in substantial ignorance
of real-world problems vis-a-vis the models. [25,
p. 362]
This § briefly describes the results of computational testing of
the GHM. The results of these applications tend to confirm that organi-
zational models based upon mathematical programming techniques can offer
a systematic and viable approach to systems and organizational design,
multiperiod planning, and resource allocation in real-world, decentralized
organizations
.
In recent months four separate problem formulations have been tested
utilizing the GHM. They include Ruefli's Department of Defense (DOD)
military plan [24], the Davis and Talvage Transhipment problem [9], the
Davis design structure formulation [10] , and the Whitford university
planning model [29,30]. The size of these problems varies. Fcr example,
a statement of the overall problem [see equations (28) through (34)] of
the Ruefli DOD formulation contained 42 variables and 38 constraints.
In contrast the Whitford university model's overall problem has over
7,200 variables and 2,800 constraints.
In order to eliminate data manipulation errors and to reduce
the man-hours required to formulate or solve a particular problem
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using the GHM, a FORTRAN computer code was written for a Control Data
Corporation CYBER-175 computer. This program utilized a separate set
of sparse matrix optimization subroutines [21].
This code offered the benefits of speed and computational ease.
For example, data preparation for the DOD problem required .75 hours
while the university problem required eighty hours. Compilation of
the GHM code required 3.5 CPU seconds. Convergence of the DOD problem
was attained in 3.4 CPU seconds, while the university model required
97.7 seconds. Both formulations converged in four iterations. Further
no starting hueristic procedures were necessary. As indicated earlier
use of goals and deviations from goals as coordinating mechanisms avoids
potential difficulties in organizational coordination caused by simplex
multipliers. Thus it appears that avoidance of simplex multipliers
obviates the need for good starting solutions cited in [5]. In contrast
to previous studies by Davis [8], Davis and Talavage [9], Christensen
and Obel [5], and those cited by Dirickx and Jennergren [12, pp. 86-97],
the GHM's results are promising. Indeed if one excludes the first
iteration (required for model initialization), the number of planning
and programming information exchanges or iterations is similar to those
actually experienced in most decentralized organizations. Unfortunately,
a detailed description of these applications is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, the interested reader is referred to Whitford [28,29]
and Whitford and Davis [30].
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper has been to describe the Generalized
Hierarchical Model (GHM), a multilevel, multiple criteria decomposition
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procedure. The GHM is an outgrowth of several decomposition algorithms
developed during the last twenty years. However, its principal coordin-
ative mechanisms are not the traditional shadow prices but performance
targets or operating goals, and the resulting deviations from those
goals. These goal deviations provide guidance on how far goals must be
adjusted to achieve organizational objectives and priorities.
Although the GHM cannot guarantee that it will generate the optimum
solution to an organization's overall problem, its limiting solution
is nearly optimal. A FORTRAN computer code has been written to imple-
ment the GHM. Testing of the algorithm has demonstrated rapid computa-
tional speed and convergence. Not only do the informational exchanges
within the algorithm closely resemble those found in actual hierarchical
organizations, the number of iterations or information exchanges required
for convergence seldom exceed the typical number of planning and/or
budgeting reviews found in most organizations.
Although the GHM offers an interesting approach to organizational
modeling, much work remains. Currently research is in progress which
utilizes the GHM to investigate the model's applicability in several
organizational, decision-making settings. However, based upon our ini-
tial results, the GHM appears to provide a systematic approach to inves-
tigating issues related to organizational design, multiperiod planning,
and resource allocation in decentralized organizations and systems.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Theorem 1
THEOREM 1 : The Generalized Hierarchical Model given by equation (1)
through equation (15) generates a feasible solution to the overall
problem, equation (28) through equation (34), at every iteration .
Proof : The proof begins by observing that constraints (6.k) and (7.k)
for managing subsystem k are identical to constraints (29. k) and (30. k)
of the overall problem if one defines
X
i
= X
i
(t) = Z j=l Xi (j) A i (j) f ° r i
= rk-l
+1 "--' r
k'
Zj
=1 *± (j)
=1 for i = r^^l, ...,r
k ,
(41. i)
( V j) - °
for j = 1, . .
.
,t.
X
.
(i) > for i = r, , +1, . . . ,r, , and
x — k-1 k
In the overall problem, each X. must satisfy the following con-
straint:
(42. i) D.X. -F..
i i > i
Within the GHM's solution process the i-th infimal subsystem on itera-
tion j must consider a similar constraint in generating X.(j):
(14. i) D. X.(j) 7F. for j = 1 t.
Because X.(t) is a convex combination of X.(l) through X.(t), X (t)
must necessarily satisfy equation (31. i) of the overall problem.
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In addition, managing subsystem k has the external goal vector,
T T T T
G,(t). In the overall problem, the vector [G..
,
G„ , . .
.
, G J (T indicates
transpose) must satisfy the constraint:
<32 >
^=i pk Gkf Go-
In generating the goals, G, (t), (k = 1,...,M), the supremal subsystem
must also satisfy the constraint:
(3) tiW^V
Because the vectors, Y (t), Y (t), y, (t) and y, (t), are generated via
constraints (6.k) and (7.k), which are identical to constraints (29. k)
and (30. k), it is possible to conclude that values for
X,. (t) for i = 1,...,N and
(42)
i
G
k (t)
Y*(t), Y~(t) V for k = 1,...,Mk vw ' k'
y^Ct), y~(t)
/
derived through the decomposition algorithm provide a feasible solution
to the overall problem. Q.E.D.
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Appendix 2
Proof of Theorem 2
THEOREM 2 : If a finite optimal solution exists to the overall problem
given by equations (28) through (34), then the linear version of the GHM,
given by (1) through (15) and (19) through (27), converges to a finite
limit.
Proof . To facilitate the proof of this theorem, several assumptions are
made. First, it will be assumed that a finite optimal solution exists
to the overall problem. Also, the following set of behavioral assump-
tions effecting decision-making at each level of the organization are
operative.
1) If at iteration t+1, G (t) is an alternate optimal solution
K.
to the supremal's decision, then G (t) will be returned to
K
the managing subsystem k as G (t+1).
K.
2) If at iteration t+1, X.(t) is an alternate optimal solution
*
to infimal is decision, then X. (t) will be returned to
l
managing subsystem k as X.(t+1).
•A,
3) If at iteration t, the set of proposals, X.(t-l), (i = r +l,...,r ),
X iC~X K.
represents an alternative optimum solution to managing subsystem
k's problem, then X?(t) = X.(t-l), (i = r +1 r ).
1 X K J. K
In every case, these behavioral assumptions are utilized only if alternate
optimal solutions exist to the subsystem's current decision. Computational
experience has shown that these assumptions hasten convergence of the model.
Furthermore, they serve as a mechanism to preventing cycling. The convergence
of the model will now be shown.
k-34-
The proof initially focuses upon the supremal subsystem's deci-
sion at iteration t+1. From each managing subsystem k, the supremal
subsystem has the feedback information, Y
,
(t) and Y~(t), (k=l,...,M).
K K
The supremal' s problem is:
(1) Min Z^
=1 [cG
G
k
(t+1) + V+ sj(t+l) + W~ s£(t+l)]
k
s. t.
(2) Gk
(t+1) + Sk (t+1) " S (t+1) = Gk (t) + Yk (t) " V £)
for k=l, . . . ,M,
(3) Z^
=1 Pk
G
k
(t+1) 1G
,
and
(4.k) G (t+1) > o, s+(t+i)> o, sT(t+i)> o
for k=l, . .
.
,M.
The solution
G
k
(t+1) = G
k
(t)
S
k (t+1)
= Yk (t)
I S
; (
t+1) = Y"(t)
is feasible for this problem, and therefore, the following condition
may be assumed:
4-1 [ccA (t+1) + Wk Sk U+1) + Wk Sk <t+1)] -
(44)
k
r
k=i t cGA (t) + << (t) +wkV t)] -
k
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Unless equation (44) holds as a strict inequality, then by assumption
1, G (t+1) = G (t), and equation (43) gives the supremal's solution. If
k k
G (t+1) does not equal G (t), then equation (44) guarantees that the
k k
overall performance or composite objective of the organization defined in
equation (35)
(35) Z(t) = S
J
S
J c.X.a) X. (j ) + £ [c Gk (t) +
k
W
k Yk
(t) + Wk Yk (t)
+ W
k yk
(t) + W
k yk
(t)]
will be improved on iteration t+1. To see this, assume that on iteration
t+1, managing subsystem k's problem is:
x
Min Z. k ., E™ c.X.(j)X.(j) + wf Y*(t+1) +i=r. ,+1 j=l i i^ J/ i J/ k k
k-1
(45. k)
W~ Y~(t+1) + w^ y£(t+l) + w~ y~(t+l)
r
(46. k) s.t. E * E^f BX(j)Uj) - Y+U+l) +
k-1 J
Y
k
(t+1) = G
k
(t+1),
(47.k) E^L
+1 £J B'X^^X.Cj) - y+Ct+1) +k-1 J
yk
(t+l) = gk , and
(48. i) EJS X,(j) =1, X,(j) >
*j-l V
for i-r^+l,. ••>rk -
Let X. (j), (i=r +l,...,r. ) and (j=l,...,t), be the optimal set ofi k— 1 k
A.(j)'s on the last iteration. The solution
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(49. k)
^
i (j)
^
±
Cj ) for j=l,...,t and I*r, .+1 , . .
.
, r.
X. (t+1) = for i=r. .+1 r.
l k-1 k
<
Y*(t+1) = S^(t+1)
Y
k (t+1)
= Sk (t+1)
yk (t+l)
= yj(t)
\ >\(t+D = y^(t)
is a feasible solution to managing subsystem k's problem for iteration
t+1. Using the feasibility of S, (t+1) and S7(t+1) in manager k's solution,
equation (49. k), and the inequality of equation (35), equation (50)
follows
.
Z
k=i { ^=l C t+i cA«)x±a)] + c Gkct+i) + < y+cwi) +k-l k
W~ Y'(t+1) + v+ yk (t+l) + w~ y~(t+l)} 1
(50) if ,{[I C , Z. V .. C.X. (j)X*(j)] + cr G. (t+1)k=l L i=l i=r, ,+1 i i J/ i J J G, kk-l k
+ wk sk (t+i)
+
+ +
W
k Sk (t+1) + wk yk (t) + wk yk (t)}
<
Z
k=l { ^i=l i ,+1 *iV3>^>] + ^ Gk (t) + K Yk (t) +
"k-l
v:k\ (t) + << (t > +vk>"k (t^
Using equations (35) and (50), it can be shown that
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(51) Z(t+1) < Z(t).
Furthermore, the solution for iteration t+1 is distinct from that for
iteration t if and only if
(52) Z(t+1) < Z(t)
Next, the interaction between managing subsystem k and its infimal
subsystems i, (i=r +l,...,r ), will be discussed. For iteration t,
K—
1
K
managing subsystem k has the optimal solution:
(53)
X
i
(t), (i=rk_ 1+l,...,rk )
Y+(t), Y, (t), y+(t), y"(t)
In defining the GHM's behavioral interactions of manager k and its i-th
infimal, manager k "assumes" that the supremal subsystem will return
the goal G (t) as G (t+1). On this basis, manager k "asks" each of
K. K.
its subordinate infimal subsystems to generate the proposal vector that
will best meet the goal vector, G (t), assuming that the other infimal
k
subsystems' proposals will be held constant. Mathematically, the manager
subtracts the contribution of the other infimal subsystems from the right
hand side of constraints (6.k) and (7.k) giving:
(54. i)
J!
l -1
X*(t) - Y+Ct) + Y~(t) =
"j
=r
i- i
+1
G
k
(t)
' E
i 1 *
—
3
—\ X,(t)
b!
3H
k-1 L -j J
(i=r
k_ 1+
l, ,rk).
By definition, the left hand side of equation (54. i) is y .(t+1) . The
manager then passes the goal, y
.
(t+1), along with its proposed action
for infimal i, X.(t), to the i-th infimal subsystem.
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Infimal subsystem i then has the following problem:
(55. i) Min cJLCt+1) + [w£|w£] o*(t+l) + [^~|w~] o~(t+l),
(56. i) s.t.
(57.1)
(58.1)
B
l
X.(t+1) - cr*(t+l) + c~(t+l) =
B!
1
*
x
±
(t) Sill
y£<t)
D
i
X
i
(t+l) -F
i
,
and
Z (t+1) >_ 0, o
±
(t+l) >_ 0, o
i
(t+l) 1 0.
The solution
(59.1)
X
±
(t+1) =
a*(t+l) =
a (t+1) =
X*(t)
Y
k
(t)
J+to
y'(t)
is a feasible solution to infimal subsystem i's problem. Therefore,
it follows that:
(60. i) c.x.(t+i) + [w*'w*]ot(t+l) + [wr'w7]cT(t+i) <ii k» k i k* k J i —
c.X*(t) + [w£wj]
Y+(t)
yk (t)
1 k« k J
llll
yk (t)
If equation (60. i) holds as an equality, then (59.1) gives at least
an alternate optimal solution to infimal subsystem i's decision. Thus
by assumption 2,
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(61. i) X.(t+1) = X*(t).
1 l
Using equations (35), (45), and (59. i) , it follows that if X
±
(t+1) # X
±
(t)
,
then Z(t+1) < Z(t). Furthermore if Z(t) = Z(t+1), then the assumptions
guarantee that:
(62)
X.(t+1) = X.(t) for i = 1.....N and
G
k
(t+1) = Gk (t)
for k = 1.....M.
The optimal solution for managing subsystem k, is thus given by
/
X.(t+1) = X.(t) for i = r. ,+l t ...,r, and
x l k-1 k
Y+(t+l) = Y+(t)
(63) <* \(t+l) = Y~(t)
y^(t+l) = y^(t) ior k = 1,.. . ,M
yk (t+l)
= yk
(t)
This implies that the supremal subsystem's and the infimal subsystems'
decisions on iteration t+2 are identical to those of iteration t+1.
Therefore, the algorithm has converged.
The previous discussion indicates that the seratium solutions will
take on the following characteristics:
(64) Z(l) > Z(2) > > Z(t*) = Z(t*+1) = ... = Z(t +t) = ... (for x >_ 0)
.
The only step that remains is to show the existence of t . Recall that
a finite optimum solution to the overall problem, Z„, is assumed
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to exist. Further by Theorem 1, the solution of the model at every
iteration is a feasible solution to the overall problem. Therefore,
it follows that:
(65) Z(t) >_ Z
Q
for all t.
Since the monotonically decreasing series seen in equation (64) is
bounded from below by equation (65), the existence of t follows such
that for any e > C,
(66)
I
Z(t +t) - Z(t ) | < Efor t >0.
Q.E.D,
The following corollary was derived in the proof of Theorem 2 and
will be given without further proof.
COROLLARY 1. The following characteristics will exist at convergence
of the model on iteration t*: X.(t +1) = X.(t +1) for i = 1,...,N.
That is, the optimal proposal generated by managing subsystem k (k=l,...,M)
the infimal subsystem i (i=r +l,...,r ) at iteration t*+l is identical
to the optimal proposal generated by infimal subsystem i.
Equations (59. i) and (63) verify Corollary 1. Further, equation
(63) demonstrates that at convergence solutions within the hierarchy
of the GHK will be identical for iterations (t +t) (t>0).
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